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 The allocation of financial resources at local, 
but also at central level, is an issue 
especially since in times of crisis, finding the 
optimum way to spend public funds 
concerns all authorities. This paper aims to 
identify the ways in which, by leaving from 
the division of powers based on the 
allocation of resources and tools available, 
the local authorities can identify an optimal 
level of public expenditure so as to achieve a 
maximum level of using them. Also, the 
paper seeks to identify the impact that the 
local public expenditure can have on the 
development of local gross domestic product 
as an expression of social welfare. 
Starting from the scientific acquisitions of 
Dick and Richard Armey, the "Armey Curve" 
was revised, thus identifying two 
components of the public sector: a central 
one and a local one. Following that, a chart 
relationship was established between the 
allocation of local public funds and the social welfare expressed by 
the local gross domestic product. By analyzing the shape of this 
chart, two econometric models have been developed: one 
regarding the impact of local resource allocation, and another one 
setting the optimal level of allocation of local public funds. 
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1. Allocation of the public financial resources of 
local communities 
The financial resource alloc a t i o n  p o l i c y  i s  s t r o n g l y
connected with the financial resources of local
communities, the main instruments being: local tax levies,
financial transfers, local public borrowings and balance
mechanisms. All these elements allow both to locally
attract financial resources and to allocate them for the
proper functioning of those entities.  
1. Local tax levies refer to the total tax liability of the
nature of taxes and contributions, which play an
important role in all financial resources spent at lower
levels of administration - state and local governments. In
1993, Richard Bird claimed in the article "Threading the
Fiscal Labyrinth: Some Issues in Fiscal Decentralization",
that, as a theoretical issue, a local tax levy must possess
the following attributes: "the structural characteristics
should be made by the local authority, the tax rate should
be set locally the taxable subject should be positioned in
the local authority and the local entity should be the
recipient of the tax levy."1
The main local tax levies applicable in a federal system
are: own tax levies in the technical sense, co-partnership
tax levies, additional tax levies and surcharges extra.  
a. Own tax levies in the technical sense are all categories
of duties which a public authority can institute under
federal and state laws. As such, junior public entities have
full power to set the tax basis and rates, the tax levy
addressee and the perception way.  
In the article " Financing Public Expenditure: The Role of
Tax Reform and the Designing of Tax System, 1991, Jeffrey
Owens articulated several factors according to which a
local tax levy is considered to be optimal: 
•  the tax flow is significant in terms of value;  
•  a high manoeuvrability of fiscal parameters is
allowed;  
                                                       
1 Bird Richard, Threading the fiscal labyrinth: some issues in 
fiscal decentralization, National Tax Journal, Vol. 46, No.2, 
June 1993, pag.213. 
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•  the tax base is irremovable;  
•  the translation of the tax burden is not allowed; 
•  the tax levy is easily acquired by the taxpayer;  
•  there is a territorial correlation between the tax 
debt and the public service;  
•  to be charged in accordance with the 
corresponding powers of the public body practicing 
it.  
b. Co-partnership tax levies are the tax levies mobilised to 
the order of the higher administrative levels, but by 
providing a parallel percentage share of the debt value of 
junior authorities. Neither the technical aspects of 
mandatory levy, nor the co-partnership rates are 
established at a lower level, but at a higher level, the 
regional and local bodies having no power of decision in 
this regard.  
c. Additional tax levies illustrate the tax levies charged by 
public entities of lower rank, by raising additional tax rates 
from the same taxable matters which is subject of taxation 
at senior level too. Therefore the tax base generates a tax 
levy mobilized at senior level, but also a tax levy 
attributable to lower rank authorities, calculated by adding 
a rate of taxation on the same basis (additional shares are 
established by lower level courts within the limits set by 
the senior rank authority).  
d.  Surcharges reveal tax levies that can be established 
and set according to some tax laws issued in the first 
higher level, no legal framework, especially central, being 
necessary. The only limitation to the practice of such tax 
l e v y  t h a t  i s  g i v e n  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  m u s t  n o t  c a u s e  
distortion effects, which is a case when the central 
authority distribution policy would be harmed.  
2.  Financial transfers are financial resources through 
which lower rank authorities supplement their needs of 
financial resources, in order to achieve various objectives, 
in the form of financial transfers made, on the one hand, 
from the federal budget to state budgets and on the other 
hand, from the state budget to local budgets.  
The most common types of relationships found in financial 
practice are: conditional transfers, unconditional 
transfers, compensatory transfers, non-compensatory 
transfers, limiting transfers, non-limiting transfers, open 
refunds and "ad hoc" transfers.  
a. Tax transfers or sharing transfers (revenue sharing) is a 
fraction of a certain type of tax attributable to local 
authorities, resulting from an operation of sharing the 
same tax base or the same tax with the central authority.  
These "factions" are regarded as budget transfers as their 
setting is made strictly by the central government, both in 
terms of choosing the type of shared tax levy, but also in 
terms of choosing the tax rate.  
The process of practicing fiscal transfers give them three 
concrete expression variants, namely: the form of rates 
deducted from some taxes of the central budget, the form 
of the amounts deducted for the benefit of the local 
budgets and the form of additional rates of certain direct 
taxes.  
•  rates deducted from some central budget taxes are 
percentage shares of certain taxes by the central 
source, determined by annual budget laws, under 
which, during the budget year, revenues from these 
taxes are shared between the central budget and 
local budgets.  
•  amounts deducted for the benefit of local budgets 
show absolute value amounts, provided in annual 
budget laws, which are granted to local authorities 
from the actual collections from a particular tax 
representing an income of the central budget.  
For example, the technique of rates and amounts split for 
the benefit of local budgets from the income tax is 
practiced in Romania, as well as the amounts deducted 
from the value added tax. Determining the amount of split 
amounts is based on careful calculation formula and the 
criteria considered are similar to those met in case of 
inter-regional / local balance transfers.  
•  additional rates to certain direct taxes are a 
percentage that, under the annual budget laws, are 
added to those used for calculating those central 
taxes and are incomes of local budgets, being 
considered as true "local taxes related to state 
taxes”2. 
b.  Conditional transfers (conditional grands) reflect 
conditional financial transfers to local courts, which can 
be used by these depending on the completion of certain 
activities, measures or targets, in many cases of a binding 
nature. The purpose of practicing such transfers is aimed 
both at promoting national policy priorities locally or at 
preventing sub-optimal provision of public goods at 
territorial level.  
c.  Unconditional transfers (unconditional grands) are 
annual financial transfers to local authorities, which can 
be freely used by them, without restriction. Their 
establishment and distribution on the lower levels is 
performed by the central authority, based on the so-called 
"distribution models", based on complicated computer 
algorithms, even "occult" sometimes.  
d. Compensatory transfers (matching grands) illustrate a 
form of conditional transfers, provided by the Central 
Authority to the local authorities, when these engage in a 
sustained way in a certain area or activity. They are 
provided to the extent that local communities also 
undertake to make a comparable effort in a particular 
                                                 
2 Trotabas  Louis,  Finances publiques, Ed. Dalloz, Paris, 
1964, pag. 471. 
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area considered appropriate by the central government 
and where it seeks funding boost.  
e.  Non-compensatory transfers (non-matching grands) 
concern transfers provided from the central budget with 
no additional funding commitment from local authorities.  
f. Limiting transfers are annual transfers the amounts of 
which shall be determined strictly from the beginning, in 
absolute terms, as they are strictly limited.  
g.  Non-limiting transfers imply a commitment by the 
central authority, which can achieve different levels, 
depending on the needs felt by local authorities.  
h. Open refunds (cost rambursment) are commitments by 
which the government undertakes to repay a certain rate 
of the costs incurred by local authorities when they 
implement local government policies.  
The development of such arrangements involves three 
distinct steps: 
•  defining, by the government, of public services for 
which it guarantees the complete or partial 
coverage of costs;  
•  preparation, by the central authority, of transfers 
able to cover costs incurred by local authorities for 
locally implemented public services of national 
interest;  
•  carrying out, by the government, of transfers to 
cover local guaranteed costs.  
Open refunds offer notable advantages: they can be used 
directly in major national importance financing; they 
relieve regional and local budgets of significant 
expenditure; they shift funds according to priority 
principles; they reduce the sub-optimal provision of public 
goods nationwide.  
With all the advantages conferred, open refunds also 
generate a series of obstacles: "they undermine local 
options, delay the process of financial decentralization, 
discourage the local initiative and, as their promoters are 
the central authorities, they increase the pressure on the 
central budget expenditures, to which, additionally, the 
costs incurred by monitoring related programs to the 
conduct of those operations are added."3  
i. "Ad hoc" or "ex post" transfers (ad hoc or ex post grands) 
are discretionary transfers made of funds available to the 
government to the favour of local communities, which 
supported during the election campaign the ruling party or 
coalition. The recipient local entities may consider them 
real "rewards" from the government for the accepted 
"political orientation" and their practice often create inter-
regional conflicts.  
                                                 
3 Bahl Roy, Intergovernmental transfers in developing and 
transition countries: principles and practice, Economic 
Development Institute, World Bank, 1999, pag.7. 
3. Local public loans illustrate financial resources 
attracted from the capital market, domestic or foreign, in 
contractual terms, by the payment of interests, by 
providing benefits to subscribers, as well as by 
reimbursing in the future the amounts such contracted. 
Through these, together with the financial transfers, the 
local authorities complete their need of financial 
resources.  
This way of adding financial resources is appealed to only 
to the extent that current income tax levies, plus financial 
transfers, do not cover the borrowing need of a lower rank 
authority. Also, such an arrangement may be appealed to 
as far as the public entity wants to conduct a series of 
investment programs with local impact or have to deal 
with some extraordinary expenses.  
4. Balance mechanisms have for foundation the fact that 
state authorities should ensure a consistent supply of 
public goods across the state, whether or not the 
territorial community is rich or poor. Although this is 
undoubtedly related to the fiscal capacity of the 
community (general tax potential of the community), 
however, a number of impediments to achieving the 
desire turn up in reality, that do not only take into account 
the degree of economic development but also the 
preferences of citizens.  
Practically, solving these impasses is achieved by applying 
various models of balance, grouped by Richard Musgrave 
into six classes. The author presented this classification in 
an article entitled "Approaches to a Fiscal Theory of 
Political Federalism", held in the seminar "Public Finances: 
Needs, Sources, and Utilization", organized by Princeton 
University in 1961.  
The first class of models consists of the fact that the 
balance is done through public expenditure per capita, 
meaning that every citizen is ensured the same volume of 
public services, regardless of its residence. Unfortunately, 
the model does not ensure that the principle of diversity is 
applied.  
The second class of models is based on the balance of 
performance, defined as the ratio of the public 
expenditure per capita and the beneficiary index of 
necessity. This arrangement partially resolves the 
applicability of the principle of diversity.  
The third class of models takes into account the 
differences existing between communities, both as need 
for public goods, and as tax capacity. In other words, the 
mechanism involves determining, at a central level, the 
average level (standard) of the "individual public necessity 
- tax capacity", which will be compared with that of the 
community. In case of communities the index of which is 
situated below the standard level, the difference coverage 
is done by the federal government through the granting of 
some transfers financed by central proportionate taxes, 
especially established for this purpose. 
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The fourth class of models is very similar to the one 
before, only that the transfers due have for value the 
difference resulting from the tax revenues that would be 
obtained by applying the proportional rate on an average 
taxation basis (a taxation basis determined as average at 
the central level) and the tax revenues that are obtained 
by applying the same proportional rates to the effective 
community taxation basis. 
The fifth class of models seeks to ensure the same level 
of performance between communities through tax levies, 
which will be differentiated from one community to 
another. The deficit caused to the federal budget is 
covered on account of shares of tax revenues collected at 
local level, due by them proportionately.  
The sixth class of models takes into account both the tax 
potential of the community, and the need for public goods, 
the balance being performed via both components 
through transfers from the superior authority. This 
mechanism provides a combination of almost all the 
previous models and has the great advantage that it 
discourages the tendency of some communities to play 
the role of a “stowaway”.  
In a restrictive sense, all the six classes of models 
presented by Musgrave should concurrently provide, by 
functionality, the vertical balance of the budget system.  
Vertical balancing of the budget system (vertical balance) 
is a quite argued topic currently and closely related to the 
internal budget connections, which refer to "the disparity 
existing between the means to mobilise revenues and the 
expenditures to be made at various levels of government.4 
In other words, vertical balancing a budget is derived from 
dividing the overall multilayered modern public finance 
and can reveal the correlation that exists between the 
expenditure responsibilities of local authorities and 
powers conferred on them by law in the spectrum of 
budget revenues. Measuring vertical balancing the budget 
system can be achieved in conditions where an imbalance 
is the result of irrational use of resources or a local 
financial mismanagement and other central government 
provides public goods with maximum efficiency. 
The first indicator to quantify vertical balancing of the 
budget system was built for the first time in 1977 by 
Joseph S. Hunter, being called by this one "vertical 
balancing factor." 
According to the author’s vision, the calculation formula of 
the coefficient has the form: 











1 k    (1) 
                                                 
4 Nobuki  Mochida,  Revenue, expediture and 
interguvernmental transfer in Japan, Workin Paper, 
Faculty of Economics, University of Tokio, 1997, pag.4. 
where:  
Ev k  is vertical balance coefficient; 
G loc. Vt  reflects the total revenue of local authorities under 
the central government control; 
loc. Ct  shows total expenditure of the budgets of local 
authorities 
The indicator quantifies the part of expenditure made of 
local budgets which are funded from sources controlled by 
local authorities and the imbalance is even greater as the 
coefficient value is close to zero. 
Currently, measuring the vertical balancing of the budget 
system is done through "vertical balancing index of the 
budget system", built in basis of the expenditure of local 
budgets, local tax revenues and the consolidated general 
budget revenue and expenditure. 












I   =  (2) 
where: 
B.Vert. I  is the index of vertical balancing of the budget 
system; 
loc.   Ch.  means local jurisdictions of expenses; 
tot.   Ch.  are the consolidated general budget expenditures; 
fisc.   Vn.  illustrates the tax income of local authorities; 
tot.   Vn.  reveals the incomes of the consolidated general 
budget. 
We note that if the indicator has over-unitary values, the 
local budget expenditures cannot be fully funded at the 
expense of local tax revenues, the budgetary system is 
under-balanced, which causes extensive financial 
resources through budget transfers from the central 
authority.  
Unlike the previous situation, if the balancing index is 
under-unitary, the local tax revenues are ahead of local 
costs; which means an over-balancing of the budget 
system and gives a greater role in local tax jurisdictions.  
According to these remarks, the closer the vertical 
balancing index is to no. 1 value, the more equitably 
shared the authority in terms of revenue and spending is 
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between the central government and the local 
jurisdictions, the volume of inter-jurisdictional transfers 
compresses and the budgetary system is approaching to 
the steady state between supply and allocation.  
The distribution of powers in terms of revenue and 
expenditure on levels of administration is a matter to be 
resolved partly, as it has its roots in the school of fiscal 
federalism and in the organization of federal state power. 
As such, state federalism implies a hierarchical structure 
of state governance in which every individual is 
simultaneously a citizen of at least two governments, 
which generates serious implications for the public 
finance system. Under such an arrangement, from a 
functional point, there should be no impediment, should 
the population be stationary demographically (people not 
change their residence with a high frequently).  
Unfortunately, in reality, the population is not stationary, 
but highly mobile, which causes strong mutations in the 
area of public sector whereas individuals will "move" on 
the ground and according to the fiscal policy measures 
that the authorities of different levels of governance will 
take.  
Furthermore, the ability of citizens to "migrate" from one 
jurisdiction to another according to certain fiscal policy 
criteria calls forth, just like in the private sector, the 
emergence of competition between public authorities - tax 
competition (fiscal competition), each trying to satisfy as 
far as possible the taxpayer desires in terms of the "paid 
tax levy - public goods received" ratio. 
To all these issues of public finances, which rest with the 
activity of a federal system, the representatives of the 
school of 'fiscal federalism' are trying to answer; this is a 
school of thought emerged in the U.S.A. in the '50s, 
studying the system of taxation and public expenditure in 
terms of powers returning to the governance of a nation at 
its various levels, from the central one to the local ones.  
The analysis of "the theory of fiscal federalism" (The theory 
of fiscal federalism) are focused, as such, on the two 
components of fiscal policy (taxation and public 
expenditure) and the idea of preserving the integrity of the 
state, must lead to the conclusion that the redistribution 
function of incomes and wealth in society as a whole, 
should be attributed to the central authority.  
A.  Distribution of powers in terms of revenue5 on the 
components of the administration system - conferring 
authority on incomes (tax assignment) - involves sharing 
the taxable matter between the central (federal) authority 
and the other jurisdictions (states composing the 
federation and local authorities).  
                                                 
5 Mutaşcu Mihai, Enache Eugen Cosmin,  Dănuleţiu Dan, 
Crâşneac Alexandru, Dogaru Eugen, Pătru Roxana, 
Modele de finanţare a dezvoltării regionale, Ed. Mirton, 
Timişoara, 2007, pag.33. 
The territorial mobility of contributors and capital 
unfortunately causes a number of shortcomings to 
achieve that goal. When a local authority imposes a high 
tax or leads an aggressive redistributive policy, its citizens 
tend to leave it, seeking a less hostile tax environment.  
The hardships caused by the mobility of taxpayers were 
observed in 1956 by Charles M. Tiebout, who in the paper 
"A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures" argued that the 
great advantage of a multi-jurisdictional system is that it 
allows individuals to "vote with their feet"6 or, in other 
words, they may opt for a combination of public services 
and local taxes that maximizes their utility, which creates 
the emergence of an "inter-jurisdictional competition". 
Tiebout also thought that if all citizens had the freedom of 
choice, then the social wealth level can reach the climax.  
Against this background, Richard Musgrave appreciated in 
1959, in the monumental work "The Theory of Public 
Finance", that the redistribution function should be 
attributed to central government. Later, in 1983, he 
manages to deliver some revenue-sharing rules between 
the links of the system of public finance: the taxes and 
charges with an increased progression should be oriented 
to public authorities located in the upper levels, the taxes 
on the profits of companies should be allocated to the 
interim authorities and the tax levies with an immovable 
taxable basis should be assigned to lower rank entities.  
Contrary to Musgrave's thinking, in 1973, Mark. V. Pauly 
admitted in the article CA Model of Local Government and 
Tax Capitalization", given the mobility of citizens in the 
territory that the redistribution function can be considered 
a true "local public good"7 and, as such, it should be close 
to local authorities.  
Among those who subsequently develop the rules of 
Musgrave, there is also Richard Bird and François 
Vaillancourt, who in the article entitled "Décentralisation 
financière et pays en développement: concepts, mesure 
et évaluation", in 1997, reveal that "the main criterion of 
division is given the mobility of the trim tax or its ability to 
move from one tax jurisdiction to another, in order to 
prevent its partial or total circumvention from tax 
liabilities8.  
The more mobile the trim tax is, the more it should be 
subject to the jurisdiction of a higher hierarchical 
authority. The trim tax on property tax is by definition 
immobile, these taxes being a good source of revenue to 
fund local services, in this respect they having to be 
deployed at lower echelons.  
                                                 
6 Tiebout M. Charles, A pure theory of local expeditures, 
Journal of Political Economy, No.5, Octomber, 1956. 
7  Pauly V. Mark, A model of local government and tax 
capitalization, Journal of Political Economy, No.10, 1976. 
8  Bird Richard, Vaillancourt François, Décentralisation 
financière et pays en développement: concepts, mesure 
et évaluation, Working Paper, University of Toronto, 
1997, pag.5. 
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In the case of income taxes of individuals and of indirect 
taxes (VAT, excise and customs duties), their trim tax is 
much more mobile than the trim tax corresponding to 
property, but without exceeding it, in this view, that of 
capital tax. From this viewpoint, many scholars consider 
that income taxes should be mobilised at the central level 
in order to ensure, in this way, the general policy of the 
central authorities in terms of income redistribution in the 
economy, and indirect taxes should provide resources to 
the authorities of local origin.  
Finally, the trim tax of income taxes of legal persons is 
characterized by a very high mobility, which determines 
that these tax revenues are allotted, with few exceptions, 
to the administrative links located at high hierarchical 
levels. 
In 1991, noting that "the function of redistribution should 
be implemented centrally through transfers"9, Robert 
Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld propose, in the article "Fiscal 
Federalism in Europe: Lesson from the United States 
Experience", an attractive option to solve the impediments 
caused taxpayers and capital mobility.  
Two prominent representatives of the school of public 
options of Chicago, Geoffrey Brennan and James 
Buchanan, attack in 1980 the concept of "tax 
competition" or "inter-jurisdictional competition. If the 
fiscal policy is hyper-centralized, then the costs incurred 
by local authorities largely depend on the transfers from 
the central government.  
In this way, the authority on local income is restricted, and 
the inter-jurisdictional competition has no more 
substance. The revenue allocation "should be determined 
on the basis of what can be considered a good central tax 
and a good local tax, while the administration and 
collection of tax revenues should be the burden of the 
central authority, since it exhibits a strong management 
valence to the economy of scale"10 
B. The distribution of powers in terms of expenditures on 
the components of the administration system - conferring 
authority for expenditures (expenditure assignment) - 
must "carry out a demarcation between what is financed 
from a budget or another, depending on which the 
distribution of allowances between the links of the budget 
system is made."11  
Friedrich von Hayek showed in September 1945, in the 
article "The Use of Knowledge in Society", published in the 
“American Economic Review”, the importance of 
                                                 
9  Inman Robert, Rubinfeld Daniel, Fiscal federalism in 
Europe: lesson from the United States experience, 
Working Paper, University of California, Berkley, 1991. 
10  Adams Charles, Mackenzie A. Gordon, 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations: the chinese system in 
perspective, Working Paper, International Monetary 
Fund, 1997, pag.7. 
11 Talpoş Ioan, Finanţele României, Vol.1, Ed. Sedona, 
Timişoara, 1995,  pag.90. 
decentralization of decision making at various levels of 
administration, based on the idea that local information is 
a usually "good information". In the context of public 
finances, because local authorities have better 
information than the central authority on local conditions, 
and sending it to the higher level would be costly and 
would distort it, local jurisdictions can make better 
decisions in the provision of public goods compared to the 
central entity.  
Charles M. Tiebout, entering in 1956, in "A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures", the concept of "tax competition", 
argues that this competition between the lower level 
public authorities is also the result of the fact that citizens 
are able to move to the jurisdiction that provide them with 
public goods according to their preferences.  
Such a phenomenon would be absent if the central 
government would finance at a large scale the production 
of public goods, and their provision should be uniform in 
the state.  
In 1957, in the article "Tenable Range of Functions of 
Local Government", George Stigler justifies the importance 
of local authorities, but also of public goods provision by 
these, in virtue of two so-called principles.  
The first principle relates to the fact that a local 
jurisdiction "works better"12 than the central government, 
provided that it receives the individual utilities and 
preferences of citizens more accurately, "according to the 
democratic rule - one person one vote"13.  
The second rule illustrates the ability of a group of citizens 
in a given geographical area, to choose by voting the 
provision of certain public goods of common interest. In 
1959, Richard Musgrave, in the now-on famous work "The 
Theory of Public Finance", identifies three types of 
government actions: macroeconomic interventions, 
redistributive interventions and microeconomic 
interventions.  
The first type of interventions is supported in most 
countries of the world from the central budget and 
concerns the need to coordinate fiscal and monetary 
policies by the central authority. Here, local authorities can 
play only the role of simple agents, which make local 
funding in response to the incitation caused by the central 
government.  
The redistributive interventions, they too, raise funds from 
the central budget, by virtue of the fact that the population 
i s  h i g h l y  m o b i l e  f r o m  o n e  l o cal jurisdiction to another. 
Where, for ethno-linguistic reasons, the mobility of citizens 
in the territory is low, a local authority can claim the right 
                                                 
12 Stigler  George,  Tenable Range of Functions of Local 
Government, Federal Expediture Policy for Economic 
Growth and Stability, Joint Economic Commitee, 
Washington, 1957. 
13 Tresch W. Richard, Public finance - A normative theory, 
Secon Edition, Academic Press, San Diego, 2002, pag.29. 
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to practice redistributive policies, funding being made of 
the regional or local budgets. 
The last type of intervention, the microeconomic ones, 
confer lower rank jurisdictions an important role, based on 
the following rules:  
•  the more the quantity and quality of public goods 
provided by the public sector vary from one local 
authority to another (utilities are considered 
heterogeneous), the more the decision of provision 
should be allocated to higher levels of authority;  
•  the more the effects, positive or negative, 
generated by a local authority over another higher 
authority, the more the production of public goods 
should be ensured by the central government, in 
order to achieve the internalization of those effects 
and to ensure the optimal level of production;  
•  the higher the possibility to provide novel public 
goods, the more their financing should be made 
from the budgets located at a lower level, thus 
encouraging innovation and inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation.  
Wallace E. Oates, in 1972, in "Fiscal federalism" solidifies 
the two principles of Stigler, by proposing the concept of 
"perfect match", which describes "a government structure, 
where each jurisdiction determined by the level of supply 
of a public good specifically includes a group of individuals 
who consume that good."14Based on the concept of 
perfect correlation, the author has developed the "optimal 
decentralization theorem", summed up as: "for a public 
good whose consumption area covers more geographical 
areas and whose production cost is the same at both 
centrally and locally, it will always be better (or at least 
equally effective) to be produced in optimal quantities, in 
a Paretian sense, locally rather than centrally".15 
Charles Adams and Gordon A. Mackenzie, drawing on the 
experience of Richard Musgrave, in 1997, in 
"Intergovernmental Tax Relations: The Chinese System in 
Perspective ", conclude that "the main guidance in 
conferring authority as to expenditures is the principle of 
benefit, whereby granting responsibilities for a particular 
function should aim at that particular judicial function to 
which the benefits of that function return."16  
The theory of fiscal federalism seeks to resolve, as we 
have seen, the building of a system of government with 
more levels, that should ensure freedom of action of 
regional and local communities, but also to allow, the 
same time, the long-term conservation of the idea of state 
in its completeness. This idea was also borrowed for 
                                                 
14 Oates  E.  Wallace,  Fiscal federalism, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Inc., New York, 1972, pag.34. 
15 Oates  E.  Wallace,  Fiscal federalism, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Inc., New York, 1972 pag.35. 
16  Adams Charles, Mackenzie A. Gordon, 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations: the Chinese system in 
perspective, Working Paper, International Monetary 
Fund, 1997, pag.6. 
unitary states, but it was defined as an essential element 
"of financial decentralization".  
3. Armey Curve  
Arthur Laffer graphically implements - Laffer Curve 17 - the 
idea expressed since 1776 by Adam Smith that too high 
tax rates destroy the basis on which taxation acts, reduce 
tax revenues collected by the state and reduce the tax 
return. Laffer Curve is a chart (Chart 1) showing the 
relationship between the tax levy rates and the total 
incomes of tax levy. According to it, any change in the 
taxation rate under the average rate will lead to increased 
tax revenues, while surpassing this rate will decrease tax 
revenues.  
Starting from the idea of Laffer, Dick and Richard Armey, 
in 1995, released in a similar way the opinion that there is 
a significant link between the public spending and the 
gross domestic product. In reality, there are many 
researchers who attribute this conceptualization to 
Professor Gerald Scully, who in 1989 published his 
acquisitions on this topic in the article The Size of the 
State, Economic Growth and the Efficient Utilization of 
National Resource, published in the journal Public Choice. 
More specifically, they consider that as public expenditure 
in the gross domestic product growth, the public sector 
(GDP) expands to a point after which it will compress. It 
                                                 
17 "Laffer Curve" was presented for the first time by Arthur 
Laffer and Laurence H. Meyer in May 1981, in the article 
Supply-Side Effects of Economic Policy, published in the 
journal of the American Studies Center for Business in St. 
Louis. 
 
Chart 1. Evolution of the income collected of tax 
levies on modifying the average tax rate  
(Laffer Curve) 
Source: Laffer, A., Meyer Laurence H., Supply-Side Effects of 
Economic Policy, Journal of Business Center for American 
Studies from St. Louis, 1981 
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argues that with the fact that the absence of the public 
sector causes anarchy (there is no law or, if there is, it is 
inapplicable, and private property is not guaranteed) and 
an extremely low level of social welfare. The first sequence 
is integrated into the area in which public expenditures 
are productive and the second one of the two is non-
productive. Armey curve is as follows (Chart 2). 
As seen from the chart, as the percentage of public 
expenditure in gross domestic product increases, the 
gross domestic product increases to a point (maximum 
point, the gross domestic product is up - GDPo and public 
expenditure is best - PEo) after which it falls.  
Moreover, it is noted that when the share of public 
expenditure in the gross domestic product is 0, the gross 
domestic product takes the GDPp value given exclusively 
by the private sector. Consequently, the wider the public 
sector (the public expenditure in the gross domestic 
product) is, the higher the social welfare or economic 
growth becomes, up to a point where it collapses. 
Important research and development of "Armey Curve" 
have made Philip Grossman in 1997, Johnny Chao and 
Herbert Grubel, in 1998, Primož Pevcin, in 2004, Roderick 
Hill, in 2008.  
Based on these considerations, we believe that we can 
"restrict" the Armey idea by "fragmenting it" into two parts:  
•  one part corresponding to the central public sector, 
where public expenditures are "controlled" by the 
central public authorities;  
•  another part corresponding to the local public 
sector (local or regional, depending on the state 
administrative-territorial  organization), in which 
public expenditures are "controlled" by the lower 
level public authorities (local or regional). 
Therefore, the "Revised Armey Curve" is as follows 
(Chart 3) 
 
The curve corresponding to the "Local public sector area" 
is located under the area of the central public sector and 
the optimal point (localCo) differs from the optimal point 
corresponding to the central government expenditure, 
obtained as the difference between PEo and localPEo. We 
can see four hypothetical situations: 
•  if PEo> localPEo and localPEo → 0, then the 
degree of local financial autonomy, on the 
allocation component, is reduced;  
•  if PEo> localPEo and localPEo → PEo, then the 
degree of local financial autonomy, on the 
allocation component, is high;  
•  if PEo = localPEo, the local authorities have powers 
equal to the powers of the central authority, on the 
allocation component;  
•  if PEo < localPEo, the local authorities have powers 
superior to the powers of the central authorities, on 
the allocation component.  
The first situation is characteristic of the highly centralised 
states, the second situation corresponds to the 
decentralized states, while the last two situations are 
virtually impossible. We believe that the "Revised Armey 
Curve" presents particular importance to quantify and 
analyze the optimal allocation of financial resources of 
local communities. The identification of the optimal point 
is achieved when the local gross domestic product is up, 
and local public expenditure optimal (social welfare or 
economic growth). 
 
Chart 2. "Armey" Curve 
Source: Armey, D., Armey, R., The Freedom Revolution: The New 
RepublicanHouse Majority Leader Tells Why Big 
Government Failed, Why Freedom Works,and How We Will 
Rebuild America, Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing 
Inc.., 1995 
 
Chart 3. "Armey" Curve 
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4. The Optimum in Local Public Finance  
In accordance with the theoretical foundations of Dick and 
Richard Armey, in 1995, related to all the theoretical 
elements developed in the previous paragraph, which aim 
at identifying the optimal level of public sector size in the 
economy in relation to the gross domestic product, this 
paragraph means to describe the process of quantifying 
the optimum local public expenditure as an equivalent 
way of measuring the size of the local public sector. The 
function that supports the empirical approach is below: 
  G = f (E, A)  (3) 
where: 
G = social welfare represented by the gross domestic 
product per capita; 
E = local public expenditure; 
A = other factors that can influence social welfare. 
Therefore, based on graphs 2 and 3, the function that 
describes the link "Local public expenditure - social 
welfare" can be described using the following type of 
nonlinear quadratic equation, with a concave-shaped 
graph (A is neglected): 
 
2
3 2 1 ) ( xE xE G E f α α α + + = =  (4) 
provided that: 
  0 ) (
" < E f  (5) 
meaning 
  0 2 3
" < = α x G  (6) 
or 
  0 3 < α  (7) 
The optimal point of the local public expenditure, where 
the social welfare is maximum, is the level where the 
order 1 derivative of the f(E) function is 0: 
  0 2 ) ( 3 2
' ' = + = = xE x G E f α α  (8) 
provided that: 
  0 3 < α  (9) 
Therefore, the allocation of local financial resources is 








Eoptimal − =  (10) 
Conclusions 
Economically speaking, any positioning of the local public 
expenditure to the right or to the left of the optimum 
section means a departure from the maximum social 
welfare. The position to the left of the local public 
expenditure as compared to the optimal level requires an 
insufficient financial allocation, which can be offset by the 
central level allocation policy. 
Per a contrario, a positioning to the right of the local public 
expenditure in relation to the optimal point requires an 
inefficient allocation of local financial resources 
(inefficient over-financing), resulting in the decrease of the 
maximum level of social welfare. 
In conclusion, we can appreciate that the "Revised Armey" 
arrangement is a good way to quantify the optimal level of 
local financial resource allocation, which allows the 
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